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Introduction 
Efficiency driven managerial reforms dominate the political agenda and practice throughout Europe 
(Steyvers et al. 2008). This contemporary logic of organizing in western local government has been 
labeled as New Public Management (NPM). It is seen as the wave of restructuring governmental 
organizations with businesslike instruments and styles during the last decades (Hood 1991, 1995, 
Windels & Christiaens 2006). The modernization does not only affect administration, restructurings also 
encompass political institutions and ways of organizing politics and public decision- and policymaking 
(Hansen 2001). NPM not solely advocates administrative innovation, it also aims to make the 
responsible political leaders much more businesslike, i.e. market-, performance-, cost-, efficiency-, 
output- and audit- oriented (Bochel & Bochel 2010, Diefenbach 2009, Pina et al. 2009, Wolmann 2012). 
This means that they have to be willing to modify their behavior and support processes of decision-
making with rational, objective and focused information derived from the private sector (Windels & 
Christiaens 2006).  
As a consequence, reformers undertook various initiatives to sensitize politicians for the NPM ideas 
(Schedler 2003). They understood that in order to successfully put the reform ideas into practice, strong 
support from politicians was necessary (Lapsley & Pallot 2000, Schedler 2003, Bochel & Bochel 2010, 
Anessi-Pessina et al. 2008). Their support and attention for NPM concepts and tools gives “political 
weight” to the NPM ideas and plays an important role in integrating them in decision-making (Tat Kei Ho 
2005). This means that councilors are key political NPM protagonists within their local government 
(Bochel & Bochel 2010, Brugué & Vallès 2005). However, it seems that reforms did not always achieve 
the expected change in politicians’ behavior (Lapsley 2000). Already in the early days of their 
implementation, some scholars warned for unintended developments and significant gaps between 
expected and actual changes (Anessi-Pessina et al. 2008). Although many governmental documents 
and speeches have claimed a shift towards a businesslike model, closer empirical study showed that 
there had actually been high continuity between the old and the new (Pollitt & Bouckaert 2000).  
“The gap between rhetorics and actions is so wide to provoke scepticism or, according to taste, 
cynicism” (Pollitt & Bouckaert 2000).  
Due to the closeness of local politicians to policymaking and -implementation and the fact that they had 
to implement the NPM reforms from the floor (in contrast with for example national politicians working 
within a framework and from a certain distance), these gaps between the intended and the actual 
results were particularly visible at the local level.  
Politicians and NPM in local government : a forced marriage? 
Some authors identify 'the lack of understanding for political processes and political decision-making’ as 
the most fundamental obstacle for integration of the NPM principles by politicians. The unpredictable 
nature of political decision-making and its sensitivity to external pressure are criticised as irrational and 
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inefficient from the rational and efficiency driven NPM logic. This competing logic between the irrational 
political and the rational NPM thinking has several origins. 
Firstly, NPM’s concept of efficiency is grounded in economics. This ‘economic efficiency’ is not easily 
matched with ‘political efficiency’- a concept that focuses on the efforts needed to attract voters in 
elections (ter Bogt 2004, Yetano 2009). Local governments are democratic political institutions, 
organizing public and common services for the citizens of the municipality. Politicians are the elected 
representatives of the plurality of opinions and interests of the citizens. (Hansen 2001). They carefully 
watch the common concerns and affairs of the municipality. Their role is to comprehend a subject 
matter from different points of view, to consider it, to compromise conflicting interests and judge what is 
most reasonable and appropriate in a given situation. This genuine political and democratic dimension 
of the role and skills of elected councillors is not easily combined with the propagated idea of rational 
and efficient decision-making (Hansen 2001).  
Secondly, NPM advocates a clear and distinct separation between ‘politics and administration’. Former 
politically dependent bureaucrats are encouraged to work as public managers separate from and equal 
to politicians. To that extent they often acquire more managerial tools and instruments. Politicians are 
expected to formulate strategic goals and control their implementation, while the latter is reconfirmed as 
the territory of the administration (Steyvers et al. 2010). This changed relation between politics and 
administration also expects certain more businesslike knowledge and qualifications from politicians 
(Steyvers et al. 2010). Indeed, to control the actions of civil servants politicians need sufficient 
knowledge of instruments and tools for modern local government management (Steyvers et al. 2010). 
However, historically and constitutionally such a distinction and separation of political versus 
administrative competence and decision making was not instituted as part of local government 
structure. The local council has, as an elected assembly of representatives and ombudsmen of the 
citizens, always been granted complete political as well as administrative competence and responsibility 
to handle local affairs (Steyvers et al. 2006). The study of Steyvers et al (2006) showed that more than 
half of the mayors (fully) disagreed with the idea that politicians should define objectives and control 
output but never intervene in the task fulfilment of the local administration. Support for this role 
distinction among Belgian mayors thus seems rather limited.  
A weak spot in research 
Notwithstanding these fundamental obstacles causing a ‘forced marriage’ between politicians and NPM 
principles, it is still not clear today exactly how much of the ‘NPM story’ has been absorbed by 
politicians all over the world (Schedler 2003, Askim 2007). We also lack understanding of  personal and 
individual characteristics that could affect politicians’ adoption of the NPM ideas and instruments. 
Research so far has provided less knowledge about politicians’ than about managers’ experiences with  
NPM concepts and tools. In general, political and social scientists show a certain restraint to study the 
adoption by politicians of (modern) management concepts. They rather stress the role alterations of 
councilors as a result of NPM reforms of local government (Steyvers et al. 2006, Guérin & Kerrouche 
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2008, Verhelst et al. 2011). Vice versa, in public management research, except from a few notable 
exceptions (authors such as Askim 2007, 2008, ter Bogt, 2004) politicians and certainly local councilors 
are only occasionally examined in investigating the results of modernization reforms. Moreover, studies 
often focus on executive politicians, with less attention for ‘ordinary’ councilors.  
Concerning the method, most evidence on politicians’ translation of the NPM idea stems from case 
studies taking a qualitative approach (Guérin & Kerrouche 2008, Verhelst et al. 2011). They have 
provided valuable insight and interesting hypotheses but little systematic evidence (Askim 2007, 
Steyvers et al. 2006, Verhelst et al. 2011). To the best of our knowledge only few studies examine 
systematically and in essence the adoption of the NPM idea by councilors. Moreover, they do not 
consider the party leaders in the council as a separate and distinct  group of politicians. Party leaders 
are a special group of front benchers among the ‘ordinary’ councilors (Askim 2007, Bochel & Bochel 
2010). Their status provides room for strong minded individuals to exploit their role if they choose so 
(Bochel & Bochel 2010). The position of party leader of the majority is often conceived as a 
steppingstone to an executive mandate as member of the college of major and aldermen. This 
closeness to the college means that these party leaders could be more familiar with the principles of 
modernization in local government. However, the duty of the opposition is to oppose, so opposition 
leaders also play a crucial role in controlling the majority. As a consequence they could also be very 
sensitive to the principle of reforming municipalities into efficient governmental organizations. Party 
leader’s acquaintanceship with NPM concepts may thus be used as a relevant indicator for the extent to 
which the NPM discourse is absorbed by non-executive politicians from both opposition and majority.  
Our analysis will focus on this group of central actors in local councils. We argue that assessing party 
leaders’ acquaintanceship with applied NPM instruments provides highly relevant information. Although 
instruments are only means to achieve ends i.e. the modernization of local government, the degree of 
their acquaintanceship enriches our comprehension of the extent to which the NPM idea has been 
assimilated by politicians. This understanding is highly relevant because all over the world local 
governments are still being reformed in a NPM driven- businesslike manner, albeit with varying success, 
especially regarding the support by politicians.  
Contribution 
The contribution of this paper is threefold. Firstly, this paper combines theoretical and empirical insights 
from accounting, political and public administration and -management literature. By focusing on the 
acquaintanceship of local council party leaders with NPM principles this study connects the results of 
public management reform to individual political factors. Secondly, since it has not yet been made clear 
how much of the NPM ideology has been absorbed by party leaders, nor by which factors this is 
affected (Tat Kei Ho 2005, Schedler 2003), the article sets a state of the art of how well party leaders 
are acquainted with NPM tools and instruments in Flemish municipal councils. It is intended as a 
quantitative complement for the existing findings of qualitative case study research. Thirdly, we argue 
that the acquaintanceship with NPM principles will be mediated by micro individual factors of key 
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individuals. We intend to reveal whether individual factors such as businesslike experience, education 
or multiple office holding can explain party leaders’ differences in acquaintanceship with NPM 
instruments and tools.  
Research Question 
The aim of this paper is to disclose the acquaintanceship of party leaders with a selection of applied 
NPM principles in Flemish municipalities and to identify the factors that mediate their acquaintanceship 
score. The analysis is certainly not intended as an evaluation of party leaders’ knowledge in terms of 
success or failure. We aim to assess how much of the NPM story has been incorporated in their 
mindset. The first research question sets a state of the art on the extent to which party leaders have 
absorbed (a selection of) NPM principles in Flemish municipal councils. The second group of research 
questions investigates to what extent micro individual factors (at individual level of party leaders) 
influences the variation in the acquaintanceship with NPM principles.  
RQ 2A -Does their acquaintanceship with NPM principles differ depending on council party leaders’ 
political experience ? 
RQ 2B -Does their acquaintanceship with NPM principles differ according to their formal political role, 
whether opposition or majority members?  
RQ 2C -Does their acquaintanceship with NPM principles differ depending on their professional 
background ? 
RQ 2D -Does their acquaintanceship with NPM principles differ according to their political mandate, 
whether combining different mandates or not? 
RQ 2E -Does their acquaintanceship with NPM principles differ according to their education, whether 
economically educated or not? 
RQ 2F -Does their acquaintanceship with NPM principles differ according to their gender, whether male 
or female? 
RQ 2G -Does their acquaintanceship with NPM principles differ according to the ideology of their party, 
whether left or right wing? 
Hypotheses 
1. Experience has a positive or negative effect on the acquaintanceship with NPM principles 
Councillors are in general increasingly highly educated and involved in local politics for a greater length 
of time (Guérin & Kerrouche 2008). However, research is inconclusive about the impact of politicians’ 
experience on the adoption of modernization ideas. Some argue that highly experienced politicians 
have good abilities to interpret information and make use of new instruments because they are more 
efficient readers of documents. Due to their superior information knowledge of their polity’s history they 
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can more efficiently interpret information. Experienced councilors also focus more on their controlling 
and policy making role (Reynaert et al. 2010). However, established party leaders could see new 
instruments as a threat to their built-up power positions (Steyvers et al. 2010). Melkers & Willoughby 
(2005) found that specifically performance information use decreased with experience. Inexperienced 
counterparts were more receptive for modernization than political veterans. De Groot et al. (2010) 
confirm this two rival suppositions, more experienced members tend to be more open-minded, but long-
tenured members rely on routine and familiar information sources.  
2. Opposition leaders are better acquainted with NPM principles 
The logic of the majority states that party leaders of the majority will focus more on policy-making and 
representation and less on control. Consequently, opposition leaders emphasize more control (Verhelst 
et al. 2011). The first evaluation of councilors’ use of instruments introduced by the Flemish local 
government act revealed significant differences between majority and opposition with more intensive 
use of opposition members (Olislagers et al. 2010). We argue that opposition leaders in the council will 
be better acquainted with instruments related to the NPM idea. 
3. Professional use of financial information increases their acquaintanceship with NPM principles 
In the NPM efficiency logic, politicians should be able to respond to, interpret, comply with, or challenge 
financial information (Guthrie et al. 1999). Due to the generally limited economic training of politicians, 
the specific professional or businesslike background of party leaders might be relevant (Brusca 1997). 
The use of financial information for professional reasons could point at a more businesslike attitude and 
a certain predisposition for control and monitoring instruments. It is thus expected to exert a positive 
effect on the acquaintanceship with the NPM idea. Therefore, we argue that a specific economic 
education enhances financial, analytical and strategic skills, very relevant for the adoption of NPM 
ideas.  
4. Combination of different political mandates increases their acquaintanceship with NPM 
principles 
Candidates for elections are becoming younger, but they are being mobilized more often. This means 
that multiple office holding occurs more frequently (Weekers et al. 2007). Politicians combining different 
mandates are indeed more experienced. Due to their broad network within and outside the political 
body, they are assumed to be better positioned to interpret unfamiliar information or work with new 
instruments (Askim 2008). As other governments are also subject to NPM reforms, they might have an 
information advantage and a superior knowledge of NPM related tools. 
5. Education in economy enhances their acquaintanceship with NPM principles 
Councillors are in general increasingly highly educated (Guérin & Kerrouche 2008). However, there is 
disagreement in literature concerning the influence of education on the adoption of NPM. The 
explanation usually offered is that people with advanced degrees and training are skilled at handling 
large amounts of formal, numerical or technical information, often generated as result of NPM inspired 
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reforms. Reynaert et al. (2010) found that higher educated councilors focused more on policy and 
control and valued less representation. This was confirmed in the evaluation of modernization reform in 
Flemish municipalities by Olislagers et al. (2010); the higher educated councilors used significantly 
more new instruments introduced by the reform. Specifically party leaders with an education in 
economics could have better abilities to recognize the advantages of businesslike instruments and 
tools. 
6. Female party leaders are better acquainted with NPM principles 
There is an expanding body of socio-psychological and political science literature suggesting that 
women have political attitudes and societal orientations that differ in meaningful ways from those of men 
(Fox & Schuhmann 1999). A distinct feminine voice appears in the politics of city management (Fox & 
Schuhmann 1999). For example, women in committee chairs in state legislatures were much more task 
oriented than their male counterparts. Women city managers bring a distinct interpretation to local 
government as they have the tendency to facilitate communication and favor more deliberate styles of 
decision-making using citizen input. Following the hypothesis of Steyvers et al. (2010) arguing for an 
enhanced openness towards the management team from female city managers, we expect women 
party leaders to be more positive on the instruments and impacts of NPM reforms.  
7. Right wing party ideology enhances party leaders’ acquaintanceship with NPM principles 
In Flemish local politics, party discipline is very important and even very strong for councilors of the 
majority. Among liberals, conservatives, and special interest parties, independents and councilors with a 
background as business person are better represented (Reynaert 2012). Civil servants are more 
present in social-democratic parties and liberal professions occur most in nationalist, regionalist or 
ethnic parties. Albeit, a clear distinction between left parties associated with an intellectual and public 
sector profile opposed to right parties with businesslike and market economic characteristics was not 
confirmed by data about recruitment patterns (Reynaert 2012). However, changes in left-right party 
composition of a government are hypothesized to be related to changes in policy (Goeminne & 
Smolders 2010). We hypothesize that leftist parties are more in favor of a large public sector which 
could be less associated with the NPM idea of businesslike local government organization. 
Consequently, we argue that party leaders of rightist parties will be more supporting for NPM principles. 
Empirical Setting  
Flanders counts 308 municipalities, covering between 80 and 480.000 inhabitants. They hold a threefold 
structure with a council, an executive and a mayor. The council is chosen through direct elections every 
six years. Dependent on the number of inhabitants, they count between 7 and 55 members. Most 
Flemish councillors have ordinary jobs and are only part-time politicians. The local councillor without an 
executive mandate spends on average 7.63 hours per week on his task as councillor and this for a very 
limited monetary compensation (Reynaert et al. 2010). 29% of the Flemish councils is chaired by a 
councillor, in 68 % it is still the mayor and in 4% it is an alderman. Multiple office holding is a frequent 
phenomenon in Belgian politics. During the 2007 Belgian federal elections, only half of the candidates 
 8 
 
were new. Of the 113 elected federal MP’s in 2010, 59% held another political mandate, of which 40,7% 
municipal councillors. In the Flemish regional parliament this is even more manifest; of the 124 
members, 107 combined a local mandate, of which 50% members of council (Weekers et al. 2007). The 
members of the executive (the College of Mayor and Aldermen) are elected by and among the council 
members, mostly as a result of a coalition agreement. About 70 % of all municipalities are coalition 
governments. The College consists of 2 to 10 members, they are in charge of day-to-day management 
and are presided by the mayor who actually is the real leader at local level (Goeminne et al. 2008, 
Valcke 2009). Local power (nearly) completely rests in the hands of the parties holding a majority 
position in the local council. 
As elsewhere in Western Europe, Flemish municipalities have undergone a major change in various 
aspects of their organization (Windels 2006). Fitting in with the rise of NPM, the Local Government Act 
of 2006 (in Dutch “Gemeentedecreet) was focused on a more businesslike and professionalized 
management of local government. The reform introduced new policy instruments with regard to financial 
management, control, audit, human resources and result oriented policy planning and evaluation. 
Because the Flemish Local Government Act is essentially mandatory, the context in which local council 
party leaders operate is largely homogeneous. Flemish municipalities share common political and 
institutional systems, experience the same economic shocks, employ similar budgetary processes and 
have identical electoral rules. 
Data collection and research method 
Our data are derived from an online survey (Dec. 2011-Feb. 2012) conducted among municipal council 
party leaders. The questionnaire asked two types of questions, one type related to biographical data 
(age, experience, profession, education …) from the respondents, the other questions asked to rate 
their acquaintanceship with a selection of 5 instruments and tools attributed to the NPM idea. Various 
sources were used to select the 5 elements, among which official documents about the Flemish local 
government act and interviews with experts involved with the implementation of the reform. 
Respondents were asked to provide a rating using a five point scale varying from 1 (very little) to 5 (very 
much) acquainted. If they did not know or did not wish to answer, they could always note ‘I do not know 
or do not wish to answer’. These responses were later coded as missing values in the data analysis. 
The questionnaire was pretested in a small pilot study with field experts.  
We send questionnaires to 529 party leaders in 123 municipal councils and after sending one reminder 
we received 389 responses of which 363 complete. This brings the survey response rate to 68%, with a 
mean of 2,95 responses for each council. In figure 1, we present the profile of the respondents in the 
survey.  
Figure 1 : profile of the respondents 
Descriptive Statistics local party leaders N 363 
      
    Minimum Maximum Mean 
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The picture corresponds with the so called 3M profile of councilors: male, middle-aged and middle 
class, high in professional status and well educated (Reynaert 2012). As elsewhere in politics, women 
are underrepresented. The average party leader is 50 years old and has been member of the council for 
two terms. He has in general a higher education and exercises an independent profession or works as 
an executive. The large majority of the party leaders are not combining different political mandates, 
which suggests that often mayors or aldermen or other councilors execute a double mandate. 
Respondents come from a range of parties and majority and opposition are almost equally represented. 
AGE  
  27 78 50,76 
EXPERIENCE (years in 
council) 
  0,1 41 12,00 
  
  Frequency Percent   
SEX male 274 75,50%   
  female 89 24,50%   
        
OPPOSITION/MAJORITY opposition 202 55,60%   
  majority 161 44,40%   
        
PROFESSION occupation:none 71 19,60%   
  independent profession 76 20,90%   
  worker/labourer 13 3,60%   
  office worker/executive 108 29,80%   
  public servant/teacher 65 17,90%   
  full time politician 15 4,10%   
  party-cabinets employee 15 4,10%   
  
        
        
EDUCATION primary education 7 1,90%   
  lower secondary education 26 7,20%   
  higher secondary education 86 23,70%   
  professional bachelor 103 28,40%   
  academic master/bachelor 133 36,60%   
  phd 8 2,20%   
  
  
EDUCATION_ECONOMY no 280 77,10%   
  yes 83 22,90%   
        
CUMUL none 326 89,80%   
  european parlement 1 0,30%   
  federal parlement 4 1,10%   
  senate 3 0,80%   
  regional parlement 3 0,80%   
  province 11 3%   
  local executive mandate 15 4,10%   
          
PARTY Open VLD (Liberals) 73 20,10%   
  CD&V (+N-VA) (Christian Democrats) 88 24,20%   
  Vlaams Belang (Extreme right) 47 12,90%   
  SPa (+Spirit) (Socialists-left progressive) 68 18,70%   
  Groen (Ecologists) 26 7,20%   
  N-VA (Nationalists) 15 4,10%   
  Local party 46 12,70%   
 10 
 
Approximately 23 % of the respondents had an economic education background, 60 % percent of the 
sample uses financial information for professional reasons.  
 
Methodology 
The NPM acquaintanceship score 
We advance that party leaders well acquainted with NPM instruments are more convinced of the 
usefulness and relevance of the NPM inspired reforms (Anessi-Pessina et al. 2008). To assess party 
leaders’ familiarity with NPM instruments, we construct an “NPM acquaintanceship score”.  It serves as 
an indicator for the extent to which they have internalized the NPM idea.  
The “NPM acquaintanceship score” is composed of their ratings of their familiarity with a five concepts 
(municipal management team, management control and policy cycle, internal control, autonomization 
and budget ownership) that reflect the implementation of NPM in Flemish municipalities (Leroy 2011). 
Figure 2 illustrates the NPM principle as conceptualized by Hood (1995) and the corresponding concept 
from the Flemish local government act. We could call it the ‘applied part of NPM’. This construct was 
pretested with field experts. Although the instruments were developed as a result of the modernization 
of Flemish municipalities, they are generic concepts representing the modernization of public 
organizations, applied at different governmental levels and in various European countries. 
Figure 2: components of the NPM_acquaintanceship_score 
NPM Principle (Hood 1991, 1995) Corresponding instrument or tool in Flemish 
Local Government (2006) 
* Shift to disaggregation of units in the public sector, 
decentralisation 
* Autonomization (creation of separate quasi 
autonomous separate units around products 
or service delivery) 
* Visible hands-on management, delegation of 
budgets, more discretionary power for management 
and clear assignment of responsibilities 
*  Budget ownership  
*  Municipal management team  
* Explicit standards and measures of performance and 
stress on private sector styles and management 
practice, private sector accounting norms, clear 
statements of goals, ‘hard look’ at objectives, stress on 
results rather than procedures, changing financial 
*  Internal control  
* Management control and policy cycle 
(‘BBC’ in Dutch) 
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reporting systems, internal and external public sector 
audits 
 
Analyses and results  
The NPM acquaintanceship score:  
In figure 3, we present descriptive statistics on party leaders’ responses for each of the survey items we 
examine. Responses fall into 5 categories (1= very little acquainted, 2 = little acquainted, 3 = neutral, 
nor little nor well acquainted, 4=  well acquainted, 5=  very well acquainted) 
Figure 3 
        
Instruments to assess NPM acquaintanceship score   Acquaintanceship (1-5) 
  N Mean Std. Dev. 
        
familiarity_mgt_team 363 3,28 1,031 
Familiarity with working of management team in 
municipality       
        
familiarity_IC 347 2,82 1,045 
Familiarity with functioning of internal control system in 
municipality       
        
familiarity_mgt_control 357 2,66 1,025 
Familiarity with principles of new management control 
system for municipalities       
        
familiarity_budgetownership 354 2,98 1,033 
Familiarity with principle of budgetownership in 
municipalities       
        
familiarity_autonomization 354 3,25 1,055 
Familiarity with concept of autonomization of activities 
and services in municipalities       
        
TOTAL acquaintanceship_score 339 15,0059 3,7755 
        
MEAN acquaintanceship_score 339 3,0012 0,7551 
        
Cronbach's Alpha N of Items : 5 0,77   
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Figure 4: Distribution of the acquaintanceship score: 
 
On average party leaders evaluate their NPM acquaintanceship as ‘nor good nor bad’ (value 3). They 
indicate to be more familiar with the municipal management team and the principle of autonomization. 
These figures are somewhat more pessimistic than the first evaluation by Olislagers et al. (2010) where 
62% of the councilors said to attach ‘a lot’ and ‘very much’ importance to the report by municipal 
secretary about internal control;  the same holds for budgetownership with 56% for ‘a lot’ and ‘very 
much’ importance. Paired sample T tests between the means of the 5 different items show that only the 
difference between autonomization and management team is not statistically significant (see figure 7 in 
appendices). There are no significant differences in score between political parties (figure 8 in 
appendices). The value of 0,77 for Cronbach’s Alpha demonstrates that the five elements are together 
comprising the same construct, NPM acquaintanceship. 
 
Determinants of the  NPM acquaintanceship score 
Linear regression analysis might provide us with the beginnings of an answer to the question which 
micro individual factors of party leaders mediate the variation in the acquaintanceship with NPM 
principles. Our dependent variable is the NPM acquaintanceship score. The model is fully illustrated in 
Figure 5 in the appendices. All conditions to perform the analysis are fulfilled (see figures 10 and 11 in 
appendices). 
Model=Y
_SCORE_NPM_ACQUAINTANCESHIP=β0+β1EXPERIENCE + β2OPP/MAJ + β3PROF.USE + β4CUMUL +β5EDU_ECONOMY 
+ β6GENDER + β7IDEOLOGY + β8SIZE+ ε  
Figure 6: Results of the regression analysis 
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ANOVA: Dependent Variable: 
acquaintanceship_score             
Model   Sum of Squares df 
Mean 
Square F Sig. 
1 Regression 295,808 8 36,976 2,843 ,005 
  Residual 3745,33 288 13,005     
  Total 4041,138 296       
              
Regression   Unstand. Coeff.   St. Coeff. t Sig. 
    B Std. Error Beta     
1 (Constant) 12,96 0,921   
14,07
5 0 
  GENDER -0,282 0,507 -0,033 -0,557 0,578 
  POPULATION 2,86E-08 0 0 0,002 0,998 
  EXPERIENCE 0,047 0,026 0,106 1,799 0,073 
  OPPOSITON/MAJORITY 0,876 0,434 0,119 2,018 0,045 
  PROFFESIONAL USE 1,096 0,448 0,145 2,445 0,015 
  CUMUL 1,504 0,706 0,123 2,13 0,034 
  EDUCATION_ECONOMY 0,081 0,51 0,009 0,158 0,874 
  LEFT-RIGHT 0,059 0,106 0,033 0,554 0,58 
              
  R R Square         
  0,271 0,073         
              
 
Figure 6 presents the results of statistical analysis to determine whether predictors affect the 
acquaintanceship score. In the discussion of the results it is fruitful to remember that the first hypothesis 
related to party leaders’ experience. Our results reveal a positive influence of experience on party 
leaders’ NPM acquaintanceship although the results are only supported at the 10% significance level. 
Long tenured party leaders are better acquainted with NPM concepts. This confirms the assumption that 
experience facilitates assimilation of new management principles. 
The second hypothesis on the impact of opposition versus majority turns out contradictory to what we 
expected. Party leaders of the majority have a better knowledge of applied NPM concepts in Flemish 
municipal councils than opposition leaders. Maybe their closeness to the college of mayor and aldermen 
results in a certain knowledge advantage. This could also point at the supremacy of the college 
members and reflect on the councilors surrounding them (Reynaert et al. 2010). Because of that, they 
might be more involved with the operational activities and service delivery in the municipality. This refers 
to their focus on the policy making role, which could also lead to an enhanced interest in instruments 
and tools for efficient local management. The third hypothesis about professional use of financial 
information is confirmed in our results. Party leaders using financial information for professional reasons 
are better positioned to be more acquainted with businesslike concepts and tools. A businesslike 
background facilitates the acceptance of managerial instruments and tools. The fourth hypothesis about 
the positive impact of multiple office holding also corroborates with our expectations. The combination of 
different political mandates promotes familiarity with businesslike concepts and tools used in Flemish 
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municipalities. The fifth hypothesis about economic education is statistically not significant. Concerning 
the sixth and seventh hypotheses, gender and partisan ideology, contrary to our initial assumptions, 
there is neither a significant impact of female party leaders nor of their membership of rightist parties on 
their NPM acquaintanceship. Finally, the control variable, measured by the population in the 
municipality, revealed no significant effect of size. 
Preliminary conclusions: a forced marriage with a happy ending ? 
NPM reforms of local government have attempted to sensitize local politicians for the NPM principles of 
rational and efficient management. Although fundamental underlying motives constitute a major 
obstacle for an adequate translation of the NPM idea in political practice, this study focused particularly 
on party leaders as an undervalued group of politicians, playing an important role as frontbenchers in 
the council. Their acquaintanceship score indicates very moderate assimilation of NPM principles, 
although factors at individual level mediate the variation in the score. Experience, using financial 
information for professional reasons and the combination of different political mandates positively 
influence party leaders acquaintanceship with NPM concepts in Flemish municipalities. This could 
provide interesting insights for reformers, as more efforts seem necessary to involve opposition leaders 
and less experienced councilors with the modernization idea in municipalities. The supposition that 
modernization was principally taking place in larger municipalities, is not supported, nor the assumption 
that businesslike instruments and tools would find more adherents in right wing parties. Maybe this is 
not so surprising as Hood (1995) already demonstrated at macro level that there is no single accepted 
explanation why NPM ideas should coalesced or caught on in a certain political context. Comparisons at 
country level show that the adoption of NPM was not simply through right-wing parties holding office. It 
looks more as a rather general process of policy diffusion than a process in which policies vary with 
party incumbency (Hood 1995:102). 
Finally, results should always be interpreted with the appropriate caution. This study reflects the 
subjective ratings of a specific group of front bench councilors that could differ from their back bench 
counterparts. Issues for further research might certainly include extending the research to all 
councillors. 
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Appendices 
Descriptives for all variables in the regression model 
Descriptive Statistics independent variables  
  Frequency Percent     
 GENDER male 274 75,50%     
  female 89 24,50%     
OPP/MAJ opposition 202 55,60%     
  majority 161 44,40%     
PROF.USE no 147 40,50%     
  yes 216 59,50%     
CUMUL no 328 90,40%     
  yes 35 9,60%     
EDU_ECONOMY no 280 77,10%     
  yes 83 22,90%     
    Minimum Maximum Mean Std. Dev. 
LEFT-RIGHT 319 2,4 9,19 5,7645 2,05525 
POPULATION 363 2133 116741 19967,06 15403,12 
EXPERIENCE 363 0,1 41 11,999 8,1309 
Dependent variable: acquaintanceship_score  
 N= 339 5 25 15,0059 3,7755 
 
Figure 5  
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Figure 10 
Coefficie
ntsa                       
Model   
Unstandardized 
Coefficients   
Standardized 
Coefficients t Sig. 
Correla
tions     
Collinea
rity 
Statistic
s   
    B Std. Error Beta     
Zero-
order 
Partia
l Part 
Toleranc
e VIF 
1 (Constant) 12,96 0,921   14,075 0           
  Gender -0,282 0,507 -0,033 -0,557 0,578 -0,063 
-
0,033 -0,032 0,902 1,108 
  population 2,86E-08 0 0 0,002 0,998 0,019 0 0 0,953 1,049 
Hyp
oth
esis 
Variable References Measure Source of 
data 
Expected sign 
 
DEPENDENT 
VARIABLE 
Hood (1995) 
Leroy (2011) 
Anessi-Pessina, Nasi 
& Steccolini (2008) 
Askim (2007 & 2008) 
NPM acquaintanceship score 
party leaders  
 
Survey council 
party leaders 
(N= 363)  
 
 
1 Experience Guérin & Kerrouche 
(2008)  
De Groot et al. (2010) 
Melkers & Willoughby 
(2005) 
Steyvers et al. (2010) 
 
Years in council (EXP) 
 
Survey council 
party leaders 
(N= 363)  
 
 
Cannot be signed 
a priori 
2 Opposition/majorit
y 
Liguori (2010) 
Reynaert et al. (2010), 
Olislagers et al. (2010) 
Dummy for opposition or majority 
(OPP/MAJ) 
Flemish 
agency for 
internal affairs, 
database local 
mandates 
(2012) 
Positive for 
opposition 
3 Professional use Brusca (1997) 
Guthrie, Olson & 
Humphrey(1999) 
Dummy for professional use of 
financial information vs not 
(PROF.USE) 
Survey council 
party leaders 
(N= 363)  
 
Positive for prof. 
use 
4 Cumul Weekers et al. (2007) 
Askim (2008) 
 
Dummy for combination of 
political mandates (international, 
national, regional, province level 
or executive local mandate) vs 
not (CUMUL) 
Belgian 
Bulletin of 
Acts, Orders 
and Decrees 
(12 August 
2011) 
 
Positive for 
cumul 
5 Economic 
education 
Guérin & Kerrouche 
(2008) 
Reynaert et al. (2010), 
Olislagers et al. (2010) 
 
Dummy for economic education 
(economics, applied economics, 
commercial school, tax, banking, 
marketing, commercial science, 
management, insurance, ...) vs 
not (EDU_ECONOMY) 
Survey council 
party leaders 
(N= 363)  
 
Positive  
6 Gender Fox & Schuhmann 
(1999), Steyvers et al. 
(2010) 
Dummy for male of female (SEX) Survey council 
party leaders 
(N= 363)  
 
Positive for 
female 
7 Ideology Reynaert (2012), 
Goeminne & Smolders 
(2010) 
Positions of political parties on a 
left-right scale with 0 
representing extreme left and 10 
representing extreme right, from 
viewpoint of politicians (LEFT-
RIGHT), see figure 9 in 
appendices for an overview 
Source: Devos 
et al. (2006) 
Positive for right 
CO
NT
RO
L 
VA
RIA
BL
E 
 Size 
 
 
 
Anessi-Pessina, Nasi 
& Steccolini (2008) 
Reynaert et al.( 2010) 
population in municipality 2011)  
(population) 
Belgian 
Federal Public 
Service 
Economy 2011 
positive 
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  EXPERIENCE 0,047 0,026 0,106 1,799 0,073 0,125 0,105 0,102 0,933 1,072 
  OPP/MAJ 0,876 0,434 0,119 2,018 0,045 0,121 0,118 0,114 0,929 1,076 
  PROF.USE 1,096 0,448 0,145 2,445 0,015 0,167 0,143 0,139 0,91 1,098 
  CUMUL 1,504 0,706 0,123 2,13 0,034 0,153 0,125 0,121 0,967 1,034 
  
EDU_ECON
OMY 0,081 0,51 0,009 0,158 0,874 0,052 0,009 0,009 0,936 1,068 
  left/right 0,059 0,106 0,033 0,554 0,58 0 0,033 0,031 0,933 1,071 
 
Figure 11: Non-Parameteric Correlations  
Correlations: Spearman's rho 
SEX OPP/MAJ PROF.USE CUMUL EDU_ECONOMY left/right population EXPERIENCE 
GENDER 1 
OPP/MAJ 
 
,161** 1 
      PROF.USE -,130* 0,014 1 
CUMUL 
 
-0,034 ,197** 0,041 1 
    EDU_ECONOMY -0,051 -0,011 ,262** -0,022 1 
left/right 
 
-,135* -,196** -0,042 -0,057 0,088 1 
  population -,153** -0,032 0,091 -0,031 -0,004 0,075 1 
EXPERIENCE -,191** -0,044 0,074 0,1 0,015 0 -0,029 1 
** Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed). 
* Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed). 
 
Figure 7: Paired sample T test between 5 components of NPM_acquaintanceship_score  
Paired Differences       t df 
Sig. (2-
tailed) 
    Mean 
Std. 
Deviation 
Std. Error 
Mean 
95% C.I. 
Difference         
Paired 
Samples 
Test         Lower Upper       
Pair 1 
familiarity_mgt_team - 
familiarity_IC 0,467 0,884 0,047 0,374 0,56 9,838 346 0, 000 
Pair 2 
familiarity_mgt_team - 
familiarity_mgt_control 0,619 1,154 0,061 0,499 0,739 10,135 356 0, 000 
Pair 3 
familiarity_mgt_team - 
familiarity_budgetownership 0,305 1,115 0,059 0,189 0,422 5,147 353 0, 000 
Pair 4 
familiarity_mgt_team - 
familiarity_autonomization 0,028 1,297 0,069 -0,107 0,164 0,41 353 0,682 
Pair 5 
familiarity_IC - 
familiarity_mgt_control 0,151 1,11 0,06 0,033 0,268 2,521 344 0,012 
Pair 6 
familiarity_IC - 
familiarity_budgetownership -0,169 1,056 0,057 -0,281 -0,057 -2,962 343 0,003 
Pair 7 
familiarity_IC - 
familiarity_autonomization -0,46 1,268 0,069 -0,595 -0,325 -6,705 340 0, 000 
Pair 8 
familiarity_mgt_control - 
familiarity_budgetownership -0,321 1,076 0,057 -0,434 -0,208 -5,595 351 0, 000 
Pair 9 
familiarity_mgt_control - 
familiarity_autonomization -0,587 1,246 0,066 -0,718 -0,456 -8,827 350 0, 000 
Pair 10 
familiarity_budgetownership - 
familiarity_autonomization -0,277 1,148 0,061 -0,398 -0,156 -4,516 349 0, 000 
 
Figure 8 
Descriptives: acquaintanceship_score for each party 
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    Mean Std. Deviation Minimum Maximum 
  Party 1 14,9714 3,87475 7 25 
  Party 2 15,6531 4,27956 7 24 
  Party 3 15,1818 3,34297 7 22 
  Party 4 15,1778 3,31175 10 25 
  Party 5 14,25 3,54168 9 20 
  Party 6 13,9231 2,17798 11 17 
  Party 7 14,6667 4,3374 5 24 
  Party 21 14,5588 4,12084 6 23 
  Party 41 16,125 3,20156 10 21 
            
Tests of Between-Subjects Effects 
Dependent Variable: 
acquaintanceship_score           
Source 
Type III Sum of 
Squares df Mean Square F Sig. 
Intercept 57627,185 1 57627,185 4013,907 0 
party 83,916 8 10,49 0,731 0,664 
Error 4709,057 328 14,357     
 
Figure 9 Ideological positions of Flemish parties (source Devos et al. 2006) 
General name  
Ecologists 2.40 
Socialists 3.35 
Nationalists 7.05 
Christian Democrats 5.78 
Liberals 6.49 
Extreme Right 9.19 
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